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Chapter 12
Costa Rica’s Pension Reform: A Decade of
Negotiated Incremental Change
Juliana Martínez Franzoni
During the past two decades, Costa Rica has transformed its pension system
and turned it into a ‘mixed model’ that combines collective and individual
savings (Mesa-Lago 2004).1 This chapter focuses on the structural reform
approved in 2000 and in effect since May 2001 and the parametric reform
approved in May 2005. The 2000 reform created a multipillar system, which
included the Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte (RIVM, or the Disability,
Old-Age, and Survivorship Regime). The RIVM was created in 1943 and
currently reaches nine out of every ten insured workers in the country. The
2005 parametric reform modified requirements and benefits of the RIVM
and created new benefits while seeking to strengthen the collective capital-
ization system. Both reforms strengthened the administrative effectiveness
of the RIVM.
This chapter discusses the main historical characteristics of the pension
system, focusing on the RIVM; describes the political context for the design
and adoption of the main reforms of the past five years; and explains
both reforms in detail. It also examines the strengths and weaknesses of
the implementation process and concludes with an exploration of tensions
within the Costa Rican pension reform.
A Brief History of the Pension System in the
Pre-reform Period
In the early 1990s, 64.5 percent of salaried and 5 percent of non-
salaried workers were covered by all public pension systems compared to
A technical report commissioned by the Estado de la Nación (State of the Nation Project)
provided me with the opportunity to organize the information regarding the 2005 reform
process (Martínez Franzoni 2005a). I also thank Ana Catalina Ramírez for her meticulous
support in completing information and bibliographic references, and Juan José Matamoros at
SUPEN for his kind support in accessing and updating data. Stephen J. Kay and Tapen Sinha
provided very helpful comments, and Stephen J. Kay patiently helped to edit a much longer
version of this chapter. Flaws remain my own.
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56.8 percent of salaried and 21.7 percent of nonsalaried workers in 2004
(Estado de la Nación 2005). Of those covered in the early 1990s, the RIVM
paid benefits for 75.9 percent of retirees and 94.7 percent of contribu-
tors (Sauma 2004), and provided 3 types of pensions: (a) old age, for
those who made the required number of contributions; (b) disability, for
those who were forced to stop working; and (c) survivorship, for depen-
dent family members of deceased-insured workers [Law 17 (Article 19);
(CCSS 1994)].
Nineteen special regimes were operating alongside the RIVM, which
operated in the public sector from the 1980s to the mid-1990s and covered
groups such as teachers, legislators, and workers in the judicial branch.
These programs offered privileged benefits, had enormous actuarial dis-
equilibria, and were financed by the national budget. They received fiscal
subsidies and had a regressive distributive impact that stood in stark con-
trast to the general lack of protection for the low-income sectors (Martínez
Franzoni and Mesa-Lago 2003).
As the 1990s progressed, things began to change. In 1992 the pension
law passed; in 1995 the teachers’ pension system was restructured; and
in 1996 Law 7605 abolished the special regime for legislators, making
them part of the RIVM system. In fact, these reforms incorporated all
public workers, except teachers and workers in the judicial branch, into
the RIVM.2 For that reason, current RIVM coverage is much higher among
insured workers than pensioners. However, the financial weight of the
regimes financed by the national budget (including teachers and the judi-
cial branch) continued to grow because it has had to honor obligations
previously contracted by the government. As Figure 12-1 shows, while the
relative weight of the RIVM decreased from 9.2 percent of social expendi-
tures in 1990 to 8.1 percent in 2003, special regimes went from 10 to 15
percent of overall social expenditures in that same period, corresponding
to 40 percent of total pension expenditures in 1990 and 52.8 percent
in 2003.
In contrast to most Latin-American pension systems and the Costa Rican
special regimes, the RIVM was created as a partially funded DB system
(called Capitalización Parcial Colectiva (CPC)) and has never operated as
a pure PAYGO system. It has functioned on a scaled-premium system with
considerable reserves, which if invested well could fund the system’s costs
along with worker’s contributions. However, in 1998 it became apparent
that in the medium term the system would face an actuarial disequilibrium,
primarily due to an imbalance between benefits and contributions.
Several factors led to the RIVM’s disequilibrium, including demographic,
labor, design, and administrative problems (Martínez Franzoni 2005a). In
demographic terms, the country had completed its transition. In other
words, life expectancy increased while infant mortality has decreased,
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Figure 12-1. Structure and evolution of public social investments in contributive
pensions (1990, 2003).
and, since 2001, population growth has been below the replacement rate
(Estado de la Nación 2005). Today, there are 55 economically dependent
people for every 100 paid workers. Toward 2018 the rate will be 44 per
100, and toward 2045 the composition of the dependent population will
no longer be predominantly younger than 15 years but rather 65 years or
older (Estado de la Nación 2003). This change will affect the labor market
as well as pensions: while in 1970 there were thirty-two contributors per
pensioner, in 2000 there were seven, and in 2040 there will be only three
(CCSS 2004a, 2004b).
Regarding labor, the growth of the informal sector, which by definition
does not contribute to social security, weakened the system’s finances. In
2003 five out of every ten new jobs were informal, three were formal, and
two were agricultural (formal or informal) (Sauma 2003). Between 1990
and 2002, an average of 25,000 formal jobs and 20,000 informal jobs were
created every year (Estado de la Nación 2003). Although informal sector
employment is not necessarily low-wage work, a significant proportion of
workers has not contributed to social security—not because they earn sub-
sistence wages but rather because they lack information, do not see the
point, or try to get a ‘free ride’. In fact, 45 percent of all informal workers
who have not contributed to social security (of which 7 of 10 are salaried)
are fully capable of contributing, while the remaining 55 percent (of which
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7 of 10 are self-employed) are partially capable (Trejos 2003). (Evasion
among those workers with full contributory capacity was also indicative
of the RIVM’s administrative inefficiency.) The limited number of workers
making regular contributions increased the demand for noncontributory
pensions. Those below the poverty line could request noncontributory
pensions from the Régimen No Contributivo (RNC, or Non-Contributory
Pension Regime)—benefits equivalent to a basic food basket, insufficient
for covering basic needs like housing, clothing, and transportation (CCSS
1995). In 2002, the RNC covered less than half of the target population
(44.5%) and had an 11,000-person waiting list, primarily because the Min-
isterio de Hacienda (Ministry of the Treasury) cut resources due to the
fiscal deficit (Castillo, Uzaga, and Carmona 2002; Durán 2002). Thus, the
Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social (CCSS, or Social Security Agency) was
granting one pension for every two retirement or survivorship applications,
and it frequently takes years for an application to be processed (Martínez
Franzoni and Mesa-Lago 2003).
Among the design issues that led to disequilibrium is the replacement
rate, which remained at 60 percent nominal since the RIVM’s creation.
The rate was based on the highest 48 monthly salaries out of the last 60,
with an additional 1 percent for every additional year of contributions over
240 contributions and a floor and ceiling fixed periodically by the CCSS
board of directors. This formula encouraged underreporting of income
during most of a person’s working life (especially in the private sector)
and overreporting (public as well as private) during the 5 years prior to
retirement. The general contribution from its creation through 2005 was
7.5 percent, divided among workers, employers, and the government and
distributed according to whether workers were salaried or self-employed
and according to the degree of qualification of the self-employed (see
Table 12-1).
Administrative weaknesses are apparent not only in the high levels of
evasion but also in the way the system handled increased longevity of
the population combined with stagnant rates of contributions.3 The sys-
tem is regressive to the extent that the higher the income level, the
higher the amount of resources required from the collective fund. Because
workers making fewer than 240 contributions were ineligible for old-age
pensions, even at a reduced rate, they had an incentive to seek disabil-
ity pensions. This situation resulted in more people receiving disability
than old-age pensions, reaching a proportion comparable to a country
at war (CCSS 2005a). It also reflected political clientelism and influence-
trafficking; workers had to know the right people to access disability
pensions.
The following reforms were designed to correct many of these problems.
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Table 12-1 Contributions by Contributors, Pillars, and Type of Insurance as
Percentage of Total Salary (2003)
Contributor Salaried Independent Insured without
Remuneration
First Pillar IVM Second Pillar Total First Pillar IVM Second Pillar
Employers 4.75 1.75 6.50 n/a n/a
Workers 2.50 2.50 5.00 7.25 5.5–7.25
(State 0–2.5)a (State 0–1.75)
State 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.25
Global 7.50 4.50 12.00 7.50 7.50
Source: Law 17, Article 33.
a Proportions established according to CCSS 2000.
Political Scenarios That Motivated the Reforms
Both the 2000 and 2005 reforms—as well as the creation of social security—
took place under Social-Christian governments, now grouped under the
Partido Unidad Social Cristiano (PUSC, or the Social-Christian Unity
Party). The reforms can be considered consecutive since the second one
facilitated changes the first one had not been able to make. Both reforms
were planned by both government authorities and civil organizations,
and they began after a failed reform effort, for which the Partido Lib-
eración Nacional (PLN, or the National Liberation Party), under the José
Figueres Olsen Administration (1998–2002), failed to get the approval of
unions. In addition, unions supported both reforms, even though they
had historically opposed adjustments to RIVM requirements and benefits
and were ideologically opposed to the creation of a system of individual
capitalization.
The 2000 Structural Reform: Creation of the
Multipillar System
The prelude to the 2000 reform was the conflict that took place under the
social-democratic Figueres administration (1994–8). Figueres opposed the
Chilean-style reform promoted by the World Bank and proposed instead a
modification to RIVM benefits and requirements, combined with the cre-
ation of a complementary individual savings pillar (Rodríguez and Durán
1998). However, the proposal did not get very far. In 1996, union demon-
strators took over CCSS headquarters to show their opposition, particularly
to the increase in the retirement age and the reduction in the replacement
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rate. They demanded that the government should improve the collection
of social security fees and the financial management of RIVM investments
before undertaking such drastic measures.
In 1998 Miguel Ángel Rodríguez won the presidential election by a
narrow majority. His agenda included an ambitious set of economic
reforms that would liberalize the telecommunication and electricity
markets and incorporate private administrators in the management of
mandatory complementary pensions. To that end, Rodríguez convened
the Foro de Concertación Nacional (FCN, or the National Bargaining
Forum) to begin negotiations about these issues. Government, business,
and labor representatives whose organizations were represented in the
CCSS board of directors participated, as did women’s organizations and
other groups representing new social movements. Although the govern-
ment expected the FCN to strengthen support for its reform propos-
als, the alliance of organizations opposed to the reform actually grew
stronger. To handle the opposition, the government changed the rules
of the game, going from requiring a consensus to requiring a majority
vote (Castro Méndez 2000). Still, in that volatile political environment,
the pension reform unexpectedly survived, unlike all the other issues
debated.
In September 1998 the pension agreement was the only one of the
96 agreements in the FCN’s final report supported by all its members
(Mesa-Lago 1998). Nevertheless, the law drafted in the legislature was
far different from the one agreed on by the FCN, so revisions and
intense deliberations in the Legislative Assembly went on for more than
a year (Castro Méndez 2000). Finally, February 2000 saw the passage
of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador (LPT, or Worker’s Protection
Law), which incorporated virtually all the agreements of the FCN (Law
7983).
The reformed pension system took effect in May 2001. Most notably from
the government’s perspective, the LPT omitted changes that the govern-
ment had sought, including an increase in the retirement age and num-
ber of required contributions, and a replacement rate reduction. These
parametric changes had been opposed by unions, cooperatives, women’s
organizations, and even the solidaristas,4 which instead demanded, and
achieved, long-expected measures to improve the administrative efficiency
of the CCSS. Among measures aimed at collecting social security revenues
were nonjudicial mechanisms, such as denying government contracts or
shutting down firms not honoring social security contributions. Unions
also agreed to create the capitalization pillar proposed by the government
and the business sector, while the government agreed that pension fund
administrators could be from either the public or private sectors (Jiménez
2000).
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The 2005 Parametric Reform: Strengthening
the RIVM
On February 18, 2004, the CCSS released its report on RIVM finances,
forecasting that in 2005 contributions would be insufficient to finance
pensions, interest from the reserves would be insufficient to pay pensions
in 2015, and the fund itself would collapse in 2022. The ILO later con-
firmed this projection but forecasts that the collapse would hit instead
in 2027. To address this financial problem, pension officials at the CCSS
proposed creating a round of bilateral talks with interested civil society
organizations largely representing businesses and workers. Cooperatives
and unions persuaded that the CCSS board of directors to create instead an
advisory commission to identify proposals for re-establishing the financial
sustainability of the RIVM. The brand-new Social Commission, also referred
to as the Comisión Técnica Institucional (or the Institutional Technical
Commission), would provide input to the CCSS board of directors ahead
of any decision (Comisión Técnica Institucional 2004). This commission
was made up of representatives from public institutions, chambers of
commerce, and labor. Women’s organizations and two public institutions,
the Defensoría de los Habitantes and the Superintendencia de Pensiones
(SUPEN, or Superintendency of Pensions), also participated as nonvoting
members.
During the first four months after the commission’s creation, external
advisers and the CCSS assessed different aspects of the actuarial equilib-
rium. The ILO played a key role as an independent arbiter concerning
the actual financial situation of the RIVM in order to reduce the initial
distrust among some of the parties. Although projections varied by five
years, the ILO validated key assumptions of the CCSS projections and,
more importantly, helped civil society representatives understand why a
parametric reform was much needed.
As mentioned above, longevity had increased—17 years since the 1960s—
while the overall contribution to the RIVM had remained fixed at 7.5
percent since 1943. To compensate for this disparity, all parties agreed to
increase contribution rates. They also agreed to discuss pension benefits for
individuals retiring with more contributions than required. Based on these
initial agreements, each sector defined what was or was not negotiable.5
The main disagreements were over replacement rates.6 The ILO’s rep-
resentative proposed an alternative, eventually supported by all parties,
that would scale pension replacement rates according to workers’ earn-
ings; that is, the higher the income, the lower the replacement rate, and
vice versa.7
The ILO’s advisers created a working group, the Grupo Técnico para la
Reforma de IVM (or the Technical Group) that worked with representatives
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from public institutions and civil organizations (but not the business sector
or the solidaristas) to consolidate all of the measures that had been pro-
posed up to that point (Grupo Técnico para la Reforma de IVM 2005).
In 1995, after several meetings, the CCSS board of directors approved the
proposal developed by the Grupo Técnico and supported by the Social
Commission, with minor modifications. Table 12-2 compares the proposals
in detail. The CCSS Pensions Management and Actuarial departments
(not the government or the board of directors) had to retreat from a
more severe adjustment in replacement rates and ended up maintaining
different retirement ages for men and women.
Main Characteristics of the Adopted Reforms
The sections below explain the structural reform of 2000, address changes
in requirements and benefits of the 2005 reform, and summarize measures
adopted to improve administrative efficiency in both 2000 and 2005.
The 2000 Structural Reform 8
After 2000, the LPT reform reorganized pensions around three comple-
mentary pillars, each based on five main parameters: (a) retirement age,
(b) percentage of contribution, (c) number of contributions, (d) reference
salary, and (e) pension replacement rates (FCN 1998). The percentage
of contribution is distributed only among insured (third pillar), between
employers and workers (second pillar), or among employers, workers,
and the government (first pillar). The pillars are combined according to
whom they cover: salaried population (first, second, and third pillars), self-
employed (first and third pillars), or population in poverty (RNC) (see
Figure 12-2).
The first pillar is DB and mandatory for salaried workers. With the
passage of the LPT, it was set to become mandatory for self-employed work-
ers as well. The second pillar is complementary, with mandatory DCs for
salaried workers. The third pillar is complementary and voluntary, available
to any person, employed or not. The RNC, targeted at people living below
the poverty line, universalizes the first pillar for those aged 65 years and
older who do not receive a contributive pension.
The first pillar is administered by the CCSS, the judicial branch, the Junta
de Pensiones y Jubilaciones del Magisterio Nacional (National Teachers
Assembly for Pensions and Retirement), the Instituto Nacional de Seguros
(INS, or the National Insurance Institute), and, in the case of the transition
system, the ministries of Labor and the Treasury. The second and third
pillars are administered by corporations created by public (such as the
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Figure 12-2. Multipillar system.
CCSS, Bancredito and Banco Popular) and private institutions. All are
regulated by the state (Law 7983).
The First Pillar
Besides the RIVM, only four regimes provide first-pillar pensions: the judi-
cial branch, the Régimen del Magisterio Nacional (teachers regime), the
INS, and the transitional regime, financed by the national budget and
closed to new contributors. Having relatively few special first-pillar regimes
is a positive step, especially by Latin-American standards, toward achieving
equal universal benefits because standard rules apply to as many people as
possible. The two special regimes for judges and teachers have contribution
and benefit rates higher than those in the RIVM.9
Formally, the RIVM promotes universalization and, along with the LPT,
mandates insurance for self-employed workers (Law 7983). To that end,
it offers both individual and collective insurance10 and provides voluntary
insurance to the non-EAP such as housewives and students.
The Second Pillar
The second pillar was created by the LPT as a mandatory complement
to the first pillar for the salaried population. It is an individual capital-
ization regime—Fondo Obligatorio de Pensión Complementaria (FOPC,
or Mandatory Complementary Pension Fund)—funded by 4.25 percent
of a worker’s total salary, with 3.25 percent coming from employers and
1 percent from workers (Article 9). Funding did not increase payroll taxes
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since contributions already made for other purposes were reallocated (Arti-
cle 48). According to estimates, the FOPC will allow a replacement rate
between 15 percent (for workers averaging less than 9 years of contribu-
tions) and 20 percent (for workers averaging 9 years or more of contribu-
tion) (SUPEN 2004).
The second pillar’s funds are tax-exempt and belong to the insured, as is
the case with third-pillar funds (see below). Workers can receive benefits as
a life annuity or permanent annuity (Articles 68 and 73). The life annuity
constitutes a monthly pension, from the day of the worker’s retirement
until his or her death (Articles 22–5 and Transitorio XIII). When the
pensioner dies, the heirs do not receive any pension. The permanent
annuity provides a pension during a period previously established with
the insured—once it expires, the pension stops—along with an optional
complementary disability and survivorship regime (Articles 27–9). If the
pensioner dies before the end of this period, the total accumulated balance
would be given to the beneficiaries (Article 29).
The LPT gives workers freedom of choice among administrators accord-
ing to the limits and regulations determined by the SUPEN (Articles
2, 9, and 11). The administrators can be either privately or publicly
owned firms and must be authorized by the SUPEN to operate.11 They
can be public institutions, public banks, social organizations, private
banks, or occupational funds. The occupational funds created by state
institutions or private companies can also become administrators (Arti-
cle 75).
Since 2003 commissions have been assessed on both contributions and
returns. Commissions range between 2 and 4 percent of a worker’s contri-
butions and between 6 and 8 percent of returns (SUPEN 2006).
In December 2006 there were eight administrators, six utilities to public
banks and two to private banks (two of the original private administrators
had merged). Workers who do not choose a fund are assigned to a desig-
nated public-sector administrator. Of the 1,542,151 affiliates in December
2006, 88 percent were with the state-owned public funds, Popular Pensiones
and BN Vital (54.3 and 20.6%, respectively). Among privately held admin-
istrators, Interfin-Banex had the most affiliates, with less than 10 percent of
the total (see Table 12-3).
Investments are mostly directed toward the public sector (85%). The
law requires administrators to invest at least 15 percent in institutions
belonging to the National Housing Financial System, which offers returns
equivalent to the average return of other investments (Article 61).
If an administrator declares bankruptcy, an affiliate selects another
administrator or is automatically assigned to one if he or she makes no
selection (Article 44). If the administrator’s assets are not enough to honor
its obligations, the government must cover the remaining contributions
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Table 12-3 Second Pillar Affiliation by
Administrator: Absolute and
Percentages (December 2006)
Administrators Affiliates Percentage
BN Vital 317,973 20.6
INS Pensiones 15,935 1.0
Popular Pensiones 837,882 54.3
Vida Plena 59,417 3.9
Interfin-Banex 127,552 8.3
BAC San José Pensiones 57,498 3.7
BCR Pensiones 106,369 6.9
CCSS OPC 19,525 1.3
Total 1,542,151 100.0
Source: SUPEN (2006).
and liquidate the administrator.12 The government’s guarantee is only
partial since it does not include interest, and after 15 or 20 years of con-
tributions, these will constitute the majority of the fund rather than the
contributions.13
The Third Pillar
The third pillar has existed since 1995 (Law 7523), but the LPT
brought it into the new multipillar system (Article 14 and following).
It stimulates voluntary saving programs through fiscal benefits (Arti-
cles 69–73) and favors the creation of pension administrators, as was
agreed in the FCN (1998, Agreements 63 and 87, described in Mesa-Lago
1998).
The 2005 Parametric Reform
The 2005 reform improved the equilibrium between the RIVM’s contri-
butions and expenses. The normal retirement age was kept at 65 years,
but the number of required contributions increased from 240 to 300.
Over a 30-year period, payroll contributions will increase from 7.5 to 10.5
percent, rising 0.5 percent every 5 years. Furthermore, workers now have
an incentive to declare their wages because their benefits depend on their
last 240 monthly real wages rather than the best 48 of the last 60 monthly
nominal wages.
The primary innovation, however, concerns replacement rates. Before
the reform, workers received a flat 52.2 percent of their real salary,
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Table 12-4 IVM Contributors: Distribution and Shares of Total Income (2004)
Salary Group Workers a (%) Total Salary (%)
From 0 to < 2 minimum salaries 76 44
From 2 to < 4 minimum salaries 16 24
From 4 to < 6 minimum salaries 4 12
6 or more minimum salaries 3 20
Source: CCSS (2005a).
a The total is less than 100% due to rounding.
regardless of income levels. The reform scaled the benefits inversely to
income levels—the lower the income, the higher the replacement rate—
thereby making the system more progressive. The first salary group (zero
to two minimum wages) includes almost 80 percent of CCSS contributors
(who account for 44% of the CCSS income); 87 percent of all insured
earn less than 3 minimum wages. On the other end, the top salary group
(more than 6 minimum wages) includes 3 percent of the contributors (who
account for 20% of total salaries). This very uneven distribution of income
makes it possible to improve replacement rates among lower earners
(see Table 12-4).
Table 12-5 presents the approved reform, distinguishing between
the basic replacement rate with 240 contributions and the additional
Table 12-5 Benefit Levels According to Salary Scale in Adopted Parametric
Reform (in %) (2005)
Salary Level,
According to
Number of
Minimum Salaries
Actual Real Basic Amount Adopted Total Amount
With 240
Contributions
(20 Years)
(a)
With 300
Contributions
(25 Years)
(b)
Maximum Amount
with 240
Contributions
(20 Years)
Maximum Amount.
with Additional 1%
(d)
(c)
0 to <2 52.2 56.5 52.5 57.5
2 to <3 52.2 56.5 51.0 56.0
3 to <4 52.2 56.5 49.4 54.4
4 to <5 52.2 56.5 47.8 52.8
5 to <6 52.2 56.5 46.2 51.2
6 to <8 52.2 56.5 44.6 49.6
8 and more 52.2 56.5 43.0 48.0
Average amount 52.2 56.5 47.8 52.8
Source: CCSS (2004b).
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replacement rate that includes an additional percentage for every 12 con-
tributions beyond 240 (1% until 65 years of age and 1.6% afterward).
A comparison of current and adopted replacement rates for people with
25 years of contributions shows that those who earn up to three minimum
wages will have improved pensions. Columns (b) and (d) show an increase
in pensions for up to 87 percent of the insured population, especially for
the 78 percent with fewer than two minimum salaries. In these income
brackets, the reform brings an average monthly increase of US$10 per
insured person. The majority of workers with high incomes contribute for
an average of 35 years. Therefore, their replacement rate effective loss will
be less than that of those contributing for 30 years. Through a higher
additional replacement rate, the reform provides an incentive for workers
to contribute longer.
Early retirees get a full replacement rate if they make just under twice
as many contributions as those required at age 65. This early retirement
is useful for formal sector workers who start contributing very early in
their careers, with high-average annual contributions, and who reach at
age 60 or 62 years with many more contributions than required at age 65
years. The reform maintained early retirement but improved differential
tables for men and women: at every age, women are required to make 6
fewer monthly contributions than men, therefore acknowledging, even if
minimally, women’s unpaid work.
Prior to the reform, individuals who did not make 240 contributions lost
the right to a contributive pension, unless they could prove disability, which
explains the high proportion of disability pensions, as discussed above. The
new reduced pension recognizes contributions below the 300 contributions
required for normal retirement, if the worker has made 180 contributions
or spent 15 years contributing. The reduced pension is calculated as a
proportion of the current minimum pension, and it begins after 75 percent
of the minimum pension with 180 contributions and complies with ILO
Agreement no. 102, which Costa Rica ratified. Finally, high-income workers
are required to make contributions based on their full wages. However,
when they retire, their pensions have a ceiling, which creates an incentive
to underdeclare wages.
The reforms took effect in November 2006, 18 months after being
approved by the CCSS. The transition rules vary by age group. For
those older than 54 years, contributions and benefits did not change.
For people between aged 45 and 54 years, changes take place gradu-
ally. For those younger than 45 years, all changes apply (Diario Oficial
La Gaceta 2005). These age groups are equivalent to 7, 17.5, and 75
percent of the contributive population, respectively (Estado de la Nación
2005).
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Table 12-6 Overall Costs as a Percentage of Salaries, without Estimating Effects
of Administrative Efficiency Improvements
Year Pre-reform
Situation
(a)
With Proposal
Supported by the
Business Sector a
With Proposal
Supported by Labor
(c)
With Adopted
Reform (with
Adjusted Assumptions)
(b) (d)
2005 7.4 7.1 7.4 7.4
2010 7.5 7.1 7.4 7.4
2015 8.2 7.6 8.0 8.0
2020 9.6 8.6 9.0 8.8
2025 11.4 9.7 10.4 9.9
2030 13.1 10.4 11.8 11.0
2035 14.7 11.1 13.2 12.4
2040 16.2 11.9 14.4 13.7
2045 18.5 13.2 16.3 15.6
Source: CCSS (2005a).
a Column (b) underestimates the costs of proposal because it considers that pensions are
adjusted according to a rate lower than inflation and that pension upgrading corresponds
to 80% of living expenses, while others consider such revaluation to be 100%.
Contribution rates are expected to rise gradually over time. The gradual
rise will help keep the funds reserve from being depleted. Table 12-6 shows
projected contribution rates according to different proposals presented at
the negotiation table as well as the one approved by the CCSS. The only
estimate that took into consideration increasing administrative efficiency
is the one formulated with the assistance of the ILO, according to which
in 2035 increased administrative efficiency would lead contributions to
decrease from 13.2 to 12.6 percent of wages.
Table 12-7 shows how the reforms averted potential financial crises. The
first critical moment is postponed by 30 years; the second by 24 years; and
the third by 26 years. Because the increase in contributions is gradual over
30 years, there are several years in which contributions are insufficient
yet balance out during the following years. The reform achieves actuarial
equilibrium of the RIVM during the next four decades, without considering
the result of improving administrative efficiency, through nonparametric
measures (primarily through increasing revenue collection and coverage),
investment returns, and better administrative controls.
Improvements in Administrative Efficiency, 2000 and 2005
The LPT introduced a set of measures to improve revenue collection.
First, it established a set of mechanisms to reduce evasion and income
12-Kay-and-Sinha-c12 OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 333 of 339 August 20, 2007 17:40
12 / Costa Rica’s Pension Reform 333
Table 12-7 Financial Sustainability Projections without Considering Increase in
Administrative Efficiency
Critical Moments Prereform
Situation
Proposal of
Pensions
Management,
Businessmen,
and solidaristas
Proposal of
INAMU, Unions,
and Cooperatives
Adopted
Reform
Contributions
insufficient to finance
expenditures
2011 2047 2036 2041
Total inflows insufficient
to cover total
expenditures; reserves
start to decline
2022 2053 2041 2046
IVM funds reserves
running out
2028 2060 2049 2054
Source: Grupo Técnico para la Reforma de IVM (2005).
Notes: Base scenario estimated by ILO based on CCSS Actuarial Department’s. It was not pos-
sible for the Actuarial Department to replicate estimates under an efficient administration
scenario as developed by ILO for one of the scenarios.
underreporting. These measures introduced or strengthened rewards and
punishments and complement existing judicial measures. They include:
(a) requiring firms to be in full compliance with social security obligations
before receiving government contracts, being eligible for tax cuts, or access-
ing public records; (b) strengthening CCSS supervision; (c) creating the
Sistema Centralizado de Recaudación (SICERE, or Centralized Collection
System); and (d) allowing the CCSS to crosscheck information with other
public databases (Castro Méndez 2000).
Second, the LPT established new parameters and regulations for invest-
ments, which eliminated for the CCSS the investment ceilings defined by
the Ministry of Treasury and allowed them to invest up to 15 percent in the
national mortgage system.
Third, the LPT established a five-year deadline to complete coverage
of self-employed workers and an August 2000 deadline to complete the
master plan to broaden coverage, which was 6 months after the LPT took
effect. Although the master plan to broaden coverage was not yet designed,
the law still mandated that total coverage had to be achieved by August
2005.
Fourth, the LPT required that up to 15 percent of public institu-
tions’ profits go to finance the expansion of coverage for self-employed
workers.
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When the Social Commission began negotiations, there were no esti-
mates regarding how well the goals of these measures were being fulfilled.
Existing evidence showed that progress was uneven, much more so with the
implementation of the SICERE (which was especially necessary to begin
the second pillar’s operation). There was also little evidence that coverage
was increasing among the self-employed. This situation began to change
only in 2004, when negotiations to modify the requirements and benefits
of the RIVM had already begun. This lack of evidence of progress generated
distrust among Costa Ricans concerning the new reforms discussed in 2004
and adopted in 2005, especially for the unions, which had been their main
advocates.
The Grupo Técnico reached a compromise agreement that would
increase coverage, reduce evasion, improve investment management, con-
trol disability pension expenditures, and collect complementary public
funding (of up to 15% of profits from public enterprises). It forecasts an
increase in contributions in 2010 based on an increase in coverage (at least
50% of the annual increase of the economically active population over 5
years). The CCSS board of directors approved these changes, which was
noted in the official record of the meeting. However, these policies are
not reflected in RIVM regulations, which could weaken compliance (CCSS
2005b).
Considerations about Implementation
The 2000 reform was highly effective in its structural component. The
2005 reform, which addressed nonparametric issues that had already been
passed in 2000 but had not been implemented, is too new to be assessed.
The CCSS is supposed to lead accountability meetings every 6 months; the
first was held only in July 2006.
The participation of Instituto Nacional de la Mujer (INAMU) in the
2005 reform reflected the greater attention to gender issues than took
place during the 2000 reform. Although not all of INAMU’s proposals were
adopted, it raised issues that had not been previously considered, such as
the economic dependency of women,14 and it argued in favor of women
having the option for early retirement.
The role of civil society organizations was very intense during the design
and adoption phases but was diluted during implementation. The tech-
nical staff of the CCSS had to make significant compromises during the
first two phases. However, they regained control of the process during
the implementation of adopted measures. It is too early to assess the gap
between policy design and implementation.
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Possible Directions for Future Reform
Because of the 2000 and 2005 reforms, the Costa Rican pension system
is a hybrid of the original pension system created during the 1940s and
a Chilean-style system adapted by successive reforms in countries like
Argentina and Uruguay. Costa Ricans took the experience of other coun-
tries with their reforms and combined this information with innovations
based on their country’s own institutional legacy. An example of this
innovation is the financing of the second pillar in conjunction with the
reform of severance payments, as it is the link between parametric and
nonparametric measures. Beyond specific policy measures, however, it is
the involvement of social, business, and, more recently, gender-sensitive
actors in policy reform that makes the Costa Rican pension system highly
distinctive.
Under the current model, Costa Rica could move further toward achiev-
ing the principles of universality, fairness, and solidarity established in its
political constitution. However, doing so would require additional adjust-
ments in requirements and benefits based on scaled replacement rates.
Among these changes, it would be necessary to improve incentives so
that high-income workers would contribute to the first pillar, rather than
evade or underreport income. It would also be necessary to draw on
collective insurance programs already available to expand contributory
coverage and family insurance, especially for women in the informal
sector.
Whether Costa Rica will follow this path or not is not clear. So far,
Costa Rica’s pension reforms have taken place at critical junctures, when
societal projects conflict (Seligson and Martínez 2005). Some policymakers
would want to increase the importance of individual savings; others would
like to eliminate or reduce the role of individual savings. For instance,
the business and financial sectors are not fully satisfied with the minor
role of individual savings. Unions are not happy with noncompliance with
measures legally established to strengthen collective accounts. The reforms
represented a compromise approved only after lengthy and arduous nego-
tiation among key stakeholders that could have potentially vetoed the
reform.
Notes
1 Argentina and Uruguay are the other two countries in the region with mixed
systems. Ecuador designed a system of this kind but at the publication of this book
had not yet implemented it (Mesa-Lago 2004). The mixed system exists in at least
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twelve European countries, making it the most widespread system outside Latin
America (Mesa-Lago and Hohnerlein in Mesa-Lago 2002).
2 See Rodríguez and Durán (1998) for a detailed discussion of the introduced
reforms.
3 In 1940, life expectancy at birth was 46.93 years compared to 78.7 in 2004 (Cen-
tral American Population Program, discussed in Méndez and Araya 2001; Estado de
la Nación 2005).
4 The solidaristas are worker–employer mutual support organizations. Unlike
unions, they cannot negotiate collectively (Law 6970).
5 Employers established 1% as the largest increase in contribution fees that they
could afford without losing competitiveness. Unions opposed a general reduction
in pensions, while the INAMU, the agency promoting women’s rights, stressed the
need to maintain different requirements for men and women.
6 One proposal—defended by management at the CCSS Pension Division, the
CCSS Actuarial Department, the business sector, and the solidaristas—consisted of
reducing the old-age pension replacement rate from 52.2 to 46.5%, reducing the
disability pension replacement rates, and eliminating the difference in the require-
ments for early retirement for men and women (Comisión Técnica Institucional
2004).
7 This measure was supported by one government representative (from INAMU),
unions, and cooperatives. They discarded the reduction in disability pensions and
proposed maintaining early retirement differences for men and women. Because
measures already established in the LPT to run the CCSS more effectively had
so far not been fully implemented, these organizations demanded that parametric
changes be conditioned to the implementation of nonparametric changes (ANEP
2004; INAMU 2004).
8 In this section, all law references correspond to the LPT unless otherwise indi-
cated.
9 For teachers, the replacement rate is 80% and the contributions are 8%
(workers), 6.75% (employers), and 0.25% (government) (Law 7531 1995, which
reformed Law 2248). In the judicial branch, the contributions are 9% (workers),
11.75% (pensioners), 11.75% (employers), and 0.25% (government). They retire
at age 62, after 30 years of service, with pensions equal to the average of the best
12 out of the last 24 salaries, or with the required years of service and/or under 62
years (Law 7333).
10 Through 150 ongoing agreements, collective insurance only covers about 32,000
people, comprising 2% of the working population (Martínez Franzoni 2005b).
11 LPT, Articles 30–8, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 54, 55, and 58–66.
12 The law established the shared responsibility of the administrators and author-
ized social organizations for harm and damages that result from fraud committed
by the members of its board of directors, employees, or promoters (LPT Articles 40
and 41).
13 For example, after its ninth year, 38.47% of the funds are contributions and
61.53% are interest. It is projected that in its 30th year, 4.4% will be contributions
and 95.6% interest (Castro Méndez 2000).
14 Regardless of the growing number of women in the economically active popula-
tion, women largely continue to access the pension system as economic dependents.
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The RIVM discourages contributions from women because declaring a remuner-
ated job, even if it is marginal, results in losing insurance as a dependent. Fur-
thermore, it is likely that most women lack sufficient information to calculate
the difference between the total pension for widowhood and their own con-
tributive pensions. Among other proposals, the INAMU insisted on exploring
the combination of contributive insurance (in pensions) and family insurance
(in health).
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